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PATTERNS IN THE BANKRUPTCY
REORGANIZATION OF LARGE, PUBLICLY
HELD COMPANIES*
Lynn M. LoPucki t & William C. Whitford tt
Several recent articles contend that Chapter 11 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code does not provide efficient procedures for redressing
the financial distress of large firms.' The authors of these articles
argue that the creditors of a financially distressed firm would fare
better if the corporation's problems were resolved in some other
way. 2 The argument has proceeded principally on a theoretical
level, since it is virtually impossible to know for certain how firms
* This Article is based on work supported by the National Science Foundation
under grant number SES-861853. Additional support has been provided by the
Endowment for Education of the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges, the
Disputes Processing Program of the University of Wisconsin Law School (which allotted
some funds originally awarded by the Hewlett Foundation), the University of Wisconsin
Law School itself, and the University of Wisconsin Graduate School. We again express
our appreciation to the 120 bankruptcy lawyers who allowed us to interview them with
respect to the cases in which they were involved. A list of their names appears in
Corporate Governance, infra note 2, at 670 n.7. We apologize for misspelling William R.
Fabrizio's name in that list. Bob Rasmussen and Mark Roe made valuable comments on
an earlier version of this Article. We are grateful for valuable research assistance
provided over the course of this project by Kevin Demet, John Gerber, Margot Leffler,
John Stoneman, John Thomure, and Ricardo Soto while students at University of
Wisconsin Law School.
t Lynn M. LoPucki is a Professor of Law at the University of Wisconsin Law
School.
tt William C. Whitford is the Young-Bascom Professor of Business Law at the Uni-
versity of Wisconsin Law School. The authors' names are in alphabetical order. The
order does not indicate relative contribution to the project or this Article. This truly has
been a joint effort.
1 E.g., Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 439
(1992); Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD.
127 (1986) [hereinafter Baird, Uneasy Case]; Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The
Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 YALE LJ. 1043 (1992); Douglas G. Baird, Revisiting
Auctions in Chapter 11, Law & Economics Working Paper No. 7, Second Series, University
of Chicago Law School (1992) (forthcoming inJ.L. & EcoN.) [hereinafter Baird, Revisit-
ing Auctions]. For a response to Bradley & Rosenzweig, see Lynn M. LoPucki, Strange
Visions in a Strange World: A Reply to Professors Bradley and Rosenzweig, 91 MICH. L. REV. 79
(1992).
2 Two basic alternatives to current Chapter 11 procedures have been suggested.
Perhaps the best known suggestion is for an expeditious auction of the firm as a going
concern shortly after the filing of a bankruptcy petition. See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE
LOGIC AND LIMrrs OF BANKRUPTCY LAW, ch. 9 (1986); Baird, Uneasy Case, supra note 1;
Baird, RevisitingAuctions, supra note 1. We have criticized this idea in Lynn M. LoPucki &
William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly
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that have been in Chapter 11 would have fared under a different
procedure. 3
We recently completed an extensive empirical study of forty-
three Chapter 11 cases involving large, publicly held firms. The
names of the debtor companies and their asset sizes at filing are
shown in Appendix One. These cases constitute the universe of
cases filed under the Bankruptcy Code by publicly held companies
reporting at least $100 million in assets at filing in which a plan of
reorganization was confirmed before March 15, 1988.4 In this Arti-
cle we report what has happened to the corporations and businesses
involved in these cases, both during reorganization and thereafter.
This account of the outcome of these cases cannot establish whether
the result of the cases would have been more or less favorable if a
different procedure had been used. Nonetheless, any critique of
Chapter 11 should begin with an understanding of what is actually
occurring in the cases.
We describe the outcomes of Chapter 11 cases by referring to
several variables used in the literature or in conversation. We do
not believe that all of these variables provide sensible criteria for a
normative evaluation of the "success" of Chapter 11. However, one
purpose of this Article is to provide information for others to use in
their evaluations.
Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669 (1993) [hereinafter LoPucki & Whitford, Corporate
Governance].
Another idea is to repeal corporate bankruptcy law entirely, allowing the claimants
of a financially distressed corporation to resort to their state law remedies. See, e.g.,
James W. Bowers, Whither What Hits the Fan? Murphy's Law, Bankruptcy Theory and the Ele-
mentary Economics of Loss Distribution, 26 GA. L. REV. 27 (1991); Bradley & Rosenzweig,
supra note 1, at 1078-88.
S Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 1, purport to have indirect proof that Chapter
11 is inefficient, but their proof is methodologically flawed. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren,
The Untenable Case for Repeal of Chapter 11, 102 YALE LJ. 437 (1992); LoPucki, supra note
I. Perhaps the best attempt at comparing the outcomes of actual reorganization cases
with what might have been is the effort of Eisenberg and Tagashira to compare reorgani-
zation outcomes in Japan with the liquidation values estimated by Japanese examiners.
See Theodore Eisenberg & Shoichi Tagashira, Estimating the Benefits of Business Reorganiza-
tions: An Empirical Study ofJapanese Compositions (Aug. 23, 1992) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the authors).
4 Details of sample selection and data collection are reported in Lynn M. LoPucki
& William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of
Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 134-37 (1990) [hereinafter LoPucki
& Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share]. For each of the 43 cases, we collected infor-
mation from the reorganization plans and disclosure statements, annual financial state-
ments contained in SEC Form 10K reports or annual reports, secondary literature about
the case, and extensive interviews with the principal attorneys participating in the cases.
Other articles published as a part of this study include Lynn M. LoPucki & William C.
Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum Shopping in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly
Held Companies, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 11; Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Preemp-
tive Cram Down, 65 AM. BANKR. LJ. 625 (1991); LoPucki & Whitford, Corporate Governance,
supra note 2.
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Bankruptcy lawyers and commentators sometimes consider a
reorganization case to be successful if a plan of reorganization has
been confirmed.5 For that reason, we provide information about
confirmation rates. We do not report data about ultimate payments
in the cases we studied.6 From the perspective of assessing benefits
received by creditors, there is a more direct measure of success in
these cases because the market values of the promises are distrib-
uted at confirmation. We reported these values in an earlier article. 7
Another test of the success of a reorganization case used in con-
versation among practitioners is whether the business or firm sur-
vived.8  Survival can mean two different things. From the
perspective of corporate law, the firm survives if it emerges from
reorganization as the same corporation, even though the assets it
owns have changed radically. We call this "entity survival," and re-
port its rate. From the perspective of suppliers, customers, and em-
ployees of the firm, it may be more important that the core
operating business rather than the corporate entity remains intact.
For example, consider a manufacturing operation that is sold to a
third party who produces the same product. From the perspective
of the employees, customers and suppliers, nothing significant may
seem to have changed, even though from the perspective of the
debtor entity, the case was a complete liquidation. We call this
"business survival," and estimate its rate.
For many commentators, a better measure of the success of a
Chapter 11 case than mere survival is the extent to which the finan-
5 See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control-Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code?, 57 Am. BANKR. Lj. 99, 106 (1983).
6 Jensen-Conklin has argued that confirmation rates are not a meaningful measure
of success because "[a] successful plan is one that will be consummated, that is, all re-
quired distributions and provisions of the plan will be completed." SusanJensen-Conk-
lin, Do Confirmed Chapter 11 Plans Consummate? The Results of a Study and Analysis of the Law,
97 Com. LJ. 297, 298 (1992) (finding that debtors performed in accord with their plans
in about fifty-eight percent of the cases in Poughkeepsie, New York Bankruptcy Court).
7 Because the cases we studied were large, there was usually post confirmation
trading in the stocks, bonds, notes and other property distributed pursuant to the plan.
We determined the market values of these distributions for the cases in our study and
reported them in LoPucki & Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share, supra note 4, at 141-
43, 164-68. We think those values are better evidence of the "success" of the proceed-
ing than data on the debtor's performance or nonperformance of the promises them-
selves. First, where the promises have a trading value, that value is a meaningfull
measure of the benefit that creditors receive from the plan. Second, the rate of perform-
ance or nonperformance of the promises would be affected by post confirmation events,
and hence the "success" rate that they indicate would not be a function solely of the
Chapter 11 proceeding.
Because there is no market for the kinds of distributions made in cases like those
studied byjensen-Conklin, supra note 6, she could not employ the method we employed.
To determine, as she did, whether debtors actually performed under their plans, was
probably the best measure of creditor benefit in her study.
8 LoPucki, supra note 5, at 106-07.
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cial performance of the company improved. One measure of this
kind of success is whether the surviving entity remained out of bank-
ruptcy after confirmation. Another measure is whether the surviv-
ing entity emerged from bankruptcy with less debt and/or improved
profitability. We use both measures in analyzing the "financial suc-
cess" of the reorganizations that we studied.
We also examine the extent to which the asset size of the com-
pany was reduced during Chapter 11. An expeditious auction of as-
sets is the most frequently suggested alternative to Chapter 11.9 Yet
we show that asset sales are already a common feature of Chapter 11
cases. Finally, we examine the extent to which control of the com-
panies changed during Chapter 11. While few would argue that
maintenance of a current management or controlling shareholder
group's power is a legitimate objective in bankruptcy, several com-
mentators have argued that, in practice, such an end has become a
primary motive for the filing of a Chapter 11 case.' 0
I
CONFIRMATION RATE
Confirmation of a reorganization plan was a requirement met
by all of the cases included in our principal study. In a satellite
study, we identified additional cases that met the criteria for inclu-
sion in our principal study except that a reorganization plan had not
been confirmed before our cut-off date of March 15, 1988.li There
were twenty-nine such cases. By February 1, 1993, there had been
confirmation in twenty-six of these cases. Two had been converted
to Chapter 7, and one had been dismissed.12 If these twenty-nine
cases are added to the forty-three cases in our principal study, we
can document confirmation of a plan in sixty-nine of the seventy-two
(96%) cases filed by large, publicly held companies within the eight
and one-half year study period. Clearly, confirmation of a reorgani-
9 See authorities cited in supra note 2.
10 See authorities cited infra note 46.
11 These cases were identified principally from lists of publicly held companies fil-
ing bankruptcy cases that are maintained by the SEC. In all of these cases the petition
was filed after the effective date of the Bankruptcy Code (October 1, 1979) but before
March 15, 1988 (our cut-off date), and the debtor company reported assets of at least
$100 million in its petition.
12 The two cases that were converted to Chapter 7 are Continental Steel and
Wedtech. Steiger Tractor was dismissed. The 26 cases that had plans confirmed are:
A.H. Robbins, Allegheny Int'l, Allis-Chalmers, American Healthcare, Basix, Beker In-
dustries, Buttes Gas & Coal, Care Enterprises, Eastmet, Global Marine, Heck's, Hunt
Brothers, Kaiser Steel, LTV Corp., McLean Industries, Michigan General, Pettibone
Corp., Public Service of N.H., Radice Corp., Texaco, Todd Shipyards, UNR Industries,
(The) Western Co., Western Preferred, Wheeling-Pittsburgh, and Worlds of Wonder.
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zation plan is commonplace in Chapter 11 cases involving large,
publicly held companies.
These findings contrast with the conventional wisdom that in
the large majority of Chapter 11 cases, generally involving smaller
companies, plans are not confirmed. 13 Practices with respect to con-
firmation in the large cases sharply diverge from that pattern. This
was not noted by some of the commentators advocating the repeal




A reorganization plan can provide for the elimination of the fil-
ing entity. Typically, in such cases, all assets of the filing company
are sold during the proceeding, with the proceeds of the sale distrib-
uted to claimants under the reorganization plan. After consumma-
tion of the reorganization plan, the company has no assets and
ceases to exist. In five of the forty-three (12%) cases that we studied
that is precisely what happened.' 5
In the thirty-eight remaining cases, some form of entity sur-
vived the Chapter 11 case. In six instances, an entity with few tangi-
ble assets was preserved primarily in order to take advantage of Net
Operating Loss Carryovers (NOLs).16 The hope was that the surviv-
ing entity would earn future profits that would then be rendered tax
free by the NOLs. 17 Absent tax considerations, it is likely that only
13 Jerome R. Kerkman, The Debtor in Full Control: A Case For Adoption of the Trustee
System, 70 MARQ,. L. REv. 159, 205-06 (Chart III) (1987) (showing that confirmation oc-
curred in only 12 of 48 cases studied (25%)); LoPucki, supra note 5, at 122-23 (data
showing confirmation rate of 43%); Ed Flynn, Statistical Analysis of Chapter 11, at 10-
11 (1989) (unpublished manuscript, cited in Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 1, at
1075 n.75) (estimating that for Chapter 11 cases filed after 1987, no more than 30% will
result in confirmed reorganization plans and that, for cases filed prior to 1987, only 17%
had resulted in confirmed plans as ofJuly 1989).
14 E.g., Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 1, at 1075 n.75. The authors cite the low
confirmation rate for plans in Chapter 11 as evidence that firms that file Chapter 11
petitions do not survive. They fail to note the distinction between large and small com-
panies that file petitions. We show in the next section that survival of large companies
that file under Chapter 11 is nearly as commonplace as is confirmation of reorganization
plans.
15 Amarex, KDT Industries, Pizza Time Theatre, Sambo's Restaurants, and Saxon
Industries.
16 Air Florida (which emerged from reorganization renamed Jet Florida), FSC
(renamed Trilos), McLouth Steel (renamed MLX Corp.), Seatrain Lines, Technical Equi-
ties, and White Motor Co. (renamed NEOAX). It is not always possible to transfer
NOLs by sale. See I.R.C. § 382 (West 1988). In these cases reorganization may have
been the only way to preserve the value of the NOLs for the claimants to the estate.
17 The normal strategy for making future profits was to acquire profitable firms.
Since the surviving entity would not need to pay taxes on the profits resulting from the
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thirty-two of forty-three (74%) cases would have produced a surviv-
ing entity.
When a debtor entity survives through confirmation, the plan
distributes shares in the surviving entity to holders of claims or in-
terests. An expeditious auction of all assets is one of the most
prominent of the currently proposed radical reforms of Chapter
11.18 If this reform were accomplished by requiring a Chapter 7
type of liquidation, there would be no shares in a surviving entity




When a company sells assets to a third party, the assets do not
disappear but are usually put to some business use. In that sense,
the business use of assets usually survives even a piecemeal liquida-
tion. In this Section, however, we consider a business to have sur-
vived only if the core business at filing remained intact in a single
entity through confirmation. We considered the core business at fil-
ing to have remained intact if a major portion of the assets remained
under common ownership and were fundamentally committed to
the same business purpose, whether that ownership was maintained
by the same entity or not.
The alternative to business survival is what we call "shattering."
Shattering means that a large portion of the company as it existed at
filing was sold off in discrete units to different buyers. In some in-
stances, units of a shattered company may simply have been shut
down for lack of a buyer.
The principal criterion we used in deciding whether a core busi-
ness survived was reduction in asset size during the case. If, without
sale of the core business, a company's assets fell by more than 50%
during the period of the case,19 we usually considered the company
to have shattered.20
In twenty-two of the forty-three (51%) cases studied, we judged
that the core business survived. In fifteen of these twenty-two
(68%) cases the core business survived within the same entity struc-
acquisition, it could offer a higher price for an acquisition likely to yield future profits
than could a competing firm lacking this tax advantage.
18 See, e.g., Baird, Uneasy Case, supra note 1; Baird, Revisiting Auctions, supra note 1.
19 The data we used in making these judgments is described infra notes 28-29 and
accompanying text.
20 In three instances, a revaluation of assets rather than asset sale caused asset size
to drop dramatically. All three companies were oil companies that filed during the dra-
matic collapse of oil prices during the mid-1980s. We determined that the core business
survived in these cases (Crystal Oil, MGF, Oxoco).
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ture. In the other seven cases the core business was transferred as a
unit to a third party. 21
In three cases the company emerged from bankruptcy with its
core business intact, but a decision had been reached to shatter the
company-i.e., to liquidate the assets by selling many discrete units.
However, it was thought more efficient to conduct the asset sales
outside of bankruptcy. 22 In eighteen other cases, we determined
that the shattering occurred while the company was in bankruptcy.
Thus, in nearly half (twenty-one of forty-three) of the cases studied,
the company either shattered before confirmation or was expected
to shatter shortly thereafter.
There are several reasons why one evaluating Chapter 11 might
be interested in whether businesses survive. 23 Among them is that a
business may provide its employees, suppliers, and customers with a
sense of community and security. Many people find that by partici-
pating in a collective human endeavor they greatly enrich their en-
joyment of life; this explains much of the enthusiasm that people
have for team sports, for example. Participation in a business can
provide similar enjoyment. 24 Moreover, a large business often pro-
vides its employees and suppliers with a feeling of economic security
(another intangible enhancement of the quality of life) because its
very size can imply permanence. When a business shatters, these
21 Appendix Two lists the 15 core businesses that survived as the same entity. The
seven core businesses that we considered to have survived after transfer to a different
entity are: Air Florida (sale to Midway), Amarex (sale to Templeton), Energetics (distri-
bution to ITR under the plan), McLouth (sale to Tang Industries), Pizza Time Theatre
(sale to Show Biz), Saxon Industries (sale to Alco), and White Motor (sale to Volvo).
The distinction between sale of an entity and sale of its assets to a third party is a
technical one, as any corporate acquisitions lawyer knows. In some cases an outside
party offered the reorganizing company cash and other assets in return for a controlling
block of shares. We categorize these cases as survival of an entity, even though the
entity became a subsidiary of the acquirer. Where the assets (rather than shares) were
purchased directly, however, there was no entity survival.
22 This strategy was chosen in order to escape bankruptcy jurisdiction over the
sales. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1), § 1129 (West 1988). The three cases referred to in the
text are HRT Industries, Marion, and EPIC.
23 Where the business is small, the owner may be a manager whose sense of career
success and self-worth is dependent on survival of the business. A defender of corpo-
rate reorganization may believe that the owner-manager(s) is (are) entitled to a second
chance, given the hidden emotional costs associated with career failure. For large com-
panies, managers may have similar concerns, but because of the size of potential losses
to creditors and others, such considerations presumably weigh less in any normative
evaluation of Chapter 11.
24 A classic study emphasizing the loss of community as a separate item of loss is
KAI ERIKSON, EVERYTHING IN rrs PATH 186-245 (1976). Erikson studied the losses suf-
fered by the survivors of the "Buffalo Creek Disaster," a dam failure in a West Virginia
hollow that destroyed several towns. Popular books written about business failures
often emphasize a similar loss when a business with which employees have identified is
closed down and its assets are sold. One example, based on a case in our study, iS JAMES
NANCE, SPLASH OF COLORS 376-96 (1984) (concerning Braniff Airways).
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intangible benefits may be lost 25 as assets are transferred to several
different entities. 26 Of course, the mere existence of such losses
does not mean that shattering is an inappropriate outcome for the
particular Chapter 11 case. In a normative evaluation of contempo-
rary Chapter 11 practices, these losses should be weighed against
any gains that result from the redeployment of assets when a com-
pany shatters.
Survival of a core business will only preserve intangible benefits
if it continues to survive after confirmation. We were able to obtain
information about post-confirmation performance for twelve of the
fifteen cases in which the core business survived within the same
entity.27 In five of the twelve cases, the company refiled under
Chapter 11 sometime after confirmation and before publication of
this article. In the other seven cases, however, the company has sur-
vived, appears to be financially healthy, and has not further reduced
its asset size. In most of these seven cases there has actually been
growth in asset size since confirmation.
IV
REDUCTION IN ASSET SIZE
The total value of the company's assets commonly declined
during Chapter 11, even when the core business survived. We
could not obtain comparable data about asset size precisely at filing
and at confirmation. 28 However, we have compared those assets re-
ported in the last annual financial report prepared by the company
before filing with the assets reported in the first annual financial
25 While it is often possible for employees and suppliers to find alternative sources
offering these intangible benefits, the transaction costs in doing so can be large. There
is, therefore, still a loss from shattering.
26 We report later that reduction in asset size was a common feature of our cases,
even if the core business survived. As assets are sold off while the core business is re-
tained, employees and suppliers may experience some loss of community or economic
security. We assume, however, that when core businesses survive, the loss of these in-
tangible benefits is diminished.
27 We often could not obtain reliable post-confirmation information where the core
business was sold. Usually the acquiring company did not report financial information
about the acquired assets separately from information about other parts of the company.
For more information about the data we collected on post-confirmation performance of
the companies studied, see infra note 43 and accompanying text.
28 Asset size is listed on the Chapter 11 petition. However, there is no requirement
that the company publicize financial information at confirmation. The disclosure state-
ment accompanying a proposed reorganization plan usually estimates asset size at con-
firmation. Because confirmation typically occurs several months after preparation of the
disclosure statement, however, and a particular estimate might or might not take into
account major changes projected to take place at or shortly after confirmation, we did
not regard the disclosure statement estimates as a consistently reliable source of data.
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statement prepared after confirmation. 29 Since annual financial re-
ports are prepared at the end of the company's fiscal year, there is
usually a gap of several months between the last pre-filing report
and the date of filing, and another gap between the date of confir-
mation and the first post-confirmation report. Therefore, all of the
asset size reduction revealed by these data did not necessarily occur
during the Chapter 11 case.3 0
The data we collected are reported in Appendix Two and sum-
marized in Table One below. In Appendix Two, we report sepa-
rately for surviving and shattering companies. Table One combines
the categories and shows the relationship between last pre-filing as-
set value and first post-confirmation asset value. Both Appendix
Two and Table One exclude companies that sold their core busi-
ness,3 ' or were scheduled to shatter, shortly after confirmation.3 2
Table One shows that reduction in asset size is almost a univer-
sal feature of Chapter 11 cases involving large, publicly held corpo-
rations. Bankruptcy analysts often characterize particular
bankruptcy cases as reorganizations or liquidations.33 This distinc-
tion is of limited usefulness with respect to large, publicly held com-
panies. Nearly all of them liquidate some assets and a few liquidate
all assets. Most of the companies included in Table One cut their
29 These financial reports are available from a variety of public sources, including
SEC 10-K filings and the annual reports of the companies. SEC 10-K filings are public
documents available from a variety of sources and annual reports can generally be ob-
tained by contacting the company. Many business school libraries have the annual re-
ports for large, publicly held companies.
30 Our data on reduction in asset size are based on accounting statements prepared
by the debtor companies. These reductions reflect partly the sale or retiring of assets, as
well as "write downs" of the value of retained assets according to accounting standards.
Where the asset reduction resulted from write downs, the true reduction in value-as
measured by what the assets could be sold for in a market transaction-may have oc-
curred in some time period other than the period in which the reduction was recognized
by accountants.
31 This exclusion was necessary because we were unable to obtain reliable informa-
tion about the value of the assets sold. The acquiring company often did not provide a
separate valuation for the assets acquired in its next annual financial report. When this
information was included, we could not determine whether changes in accounting meth-
odology rendered the figure incomparable to the data we had about the value of the
selling company's assets before filing. We also did not obtain reliable information about
the purchase price of the assets.
32 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. We were not able to obtain data about
four other cases, as shown in Appendix Two. These cases are not shown in Table One.
The usual difficulty was that some firms did not publish annual financial reports or make
SEC 10-K filings after confirmation.
33 For example, Bradley and Rosenzweig rely heavily on this distinction in their
analysis. They "refer to the choice between liquidation and reorganization as the Chap-
ter 11 dilemma." Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 1, at 1051. They conclude that
"existing bankruptcy rules encourage corporate managers to reorganize under Chapter
11 when liquidation might make more sense economically, thus generating significant
bankruptcy and near-default costs." Id. at 1078.
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TABLE 1
DEGREE OF SHRINKAGE DURING CHAPTER 11
Table shows the number of companies emerging from Chapter 11 at a particular size in
relation to the company's size before filing.
Emerging Emerging Emerging Emerging
company company company company Total
over 90% 51% to 90% 10% to 50% under 10% number
size of size of size of of of
filing company filing company filing company filing company companies
2 9 11 7 29
size by more than half. The meaningful distinction is among various




A bankruptcy reorganization may be able to resolve two distinct
kinds of financial problems for a troubled company. First, a com-
pany may be incurring substantial operating losses that are not
merely the product of temporary market conditions. In these cases,
the company normally considers selling losing parts of its overall
business and cutting costs through the adoption of more efficient
methods. Second, the company may have incurred too much debt
and become unable to meet its obligations at any reasonably fore-
seeable level of operating revenue. One solution is to reduce the
amount of debt through bankruptcy discharge.
Mark Roe, a critic of Chapter 11, argues that the bargaining
dynamics of bankruptcy reorganization cause firms to leave Chapter
11 with debt levels so high that they threaten the future financial
success of the emerging companies.3 4 If true, Chapter 11 is not
helping companies meet the second kind of financial problem iden-
tified above. Such a result would be a serious indictment of Chapter
11 as it is currently constituted.
34 Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 527, 536-48 (1983). Roe's thesis is that it is very hard to confirm a plan
that provides nothing for equity holders, even though the company is insolvent. He
believes that cramdown is impractical, and hence the only way to confirm a plan is to get
the consent of all classes entitled to vote on the plan, including equity holders. To
obtain that consent, each class must be provided something. Roe's hypothesis is that
creditors meet this imperative by agreeing to provide some shares in the reorganized
company to previous equity holders, while loading the reorganized company with so
much fixed debt (to be distributed to creditor interests under the plan) that the reorgan-
ization shares have little value. Large fixed debt ensures that the future profits of the
company will go to holders of debt instruments.
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To test Roe's hypothesis, we worked from the amounts of debt
and equity shown on the emerging companies' annual financial re-
ports for the first reporting dates after confirmation.3 5 From these
statistics we calculated debt/equity ratios for twenty-six of the forty-
three companies in our study.3 6 From a published source, we found
the average debt/equity ratio for companies of comparable size in
the same businesses as each of these twenty-six debtors.3 7 We refer
to this industry average as the "benchmark" ratio for each of our
emerging companies.
For nineteen of the twenty-six companies (76%) in our study,
the actual debt/equity ratio exceeds the benchmark ratio. The per-
centage of these twenty-six companies with debt/equity ratios above
the average for their industry is statistically significant.38 From this,
we conclude that some factor or factors caused some of these com-
panies to have above average debt/equity ratios at the time of their
first post-confirmation financial statement. One factor could be a
35 Unfortunately, we could not measure directly whether debt loads were too high
precisely at confirmation. Our data concerning a company's debts came principally from
disclosure statements accompanying the plan of reorganization. If the reorganization
plan left secured debt unimpaired, as was often the case, the disclosure statement fre-
quently did not provide information on the amount of this debt. Moreover, disclosure
statements do not provide complete information about current short-term debt result-
ing from ongoing operations. Such debt is post-petition debt and theoretically an ad-
ministrative expense. It is often paid in the ordinary course as it becomes due. At best,
disclosure statements prepared several months before confirmation provide only esti-
mates of short term debt at confirmation. See supra note 28. Frequently they fail to do
even that.
36 The debt/equity ratio we use compares the value of debt to the value of debt and
equity combined. If the value of the equity is negative, because the company's debt
exceeds the value of its assets, then the ratio will be greater than one. Ratios are ex-
pressed in percentages, in accordance with normal usage. The most common reason we
were unable to obtain data for 17 of the 43 companies studied was the unavailability of a
post-confirmation financial statement, sometimes because the company ceased to exist
after confirmation.
37 Typical debt/equity ratios vary widely by industry. In calculating a benchmark
rate for each of our companies, we first identified the SIC code for the company's pri-
mary business after confirmation. In some cases we identified two primary businesses
for the company. We then obtained the average debt/equity ratio reported by LEO
TROY, ALMANAC OF BUSINESS AND INDUSTRIAL FINANCIAL RATIos (1987), for companies of
comparable asset size with businesses in the same SIC Code grouping. If we identified
two primary businesses for a company, we averaged the debt/equity benchmark ratio we
associated with each business to obtain a benchmark ratio for that company.
38 To test for statistical significance, we established a null hypothesis that half of the
companies would have a debt/equity ratio above the benchmark ratio (i.e., the average
for their industry or industries). Using the z-score method, the probability that as many
as 19 companies would have debt/equity ratios greater than the benchmark rate is .015
(one tail test). This is less than the .05 probability used as the standard measure of
statistical significance in social science research. See J. FREUND & R. WALPOLE, MATHE-
MATICAL STATISTICS 429-31 (4th ed. 1987).
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tendency 39 to emerge from Chapter 11 with more debt than is finan-
cially provident, as hypothesized. 40 The debt/equity ratios and
benchmark rates for these twenty-six companies are provided in Ap-
pendix Three.
We have other data suggesting a tendency for companies to
emerge from Chapter 11 with too much debt. A surviving entity
remained after confirmation in thirty-eight of the forty-three compa-
nies in our study.4 1 In twelve of those thirty-eight cases (32%), the
emerging entity filed another bankruptcy petition before July 1,
1992.42 This is a strikingly high refiling rate.43 Moreover, a review
of contemporary news accounts indicates that at least four of the
twelve refilings were significantly caused by financial problems still
existing at the time of confirmation. 44 The Bankruptcy Code re-
39 The dynamics of the bargaining process apparently do not inevitably yield a re-
organization plan providing for excessive indebtedness; a number of our companies had
debt/equity ratios at the time of the first post-confirmation financial report that were
lower than customary for companies with similar businesses.
40 We stress that our data are based on the first financial report published after
confirmation, a period that ranged for the 26 cases from zero to twelve months after
confirmation and averaged four and a half months. During this post-confirmation pe-
riod, many of the companies entered into significant transactions that affected their
debt/equity ratios. Though we have no reason to think so, it is possible that companies
that emerge from Chapter 11 have a tendency to take on too much debt post-confirma-
tion and that this accounts for the statistical tendency we have observed.
41 Supra text accompanying note 15. In some cases more than one entity survived
reorganization, because a subsidiary was reorganized as a separate concern. In those
cases we followed the performance of only the principal surviving entity. We also at-
tempted to follow the financial success of companies that bought the core assets of a
company in Chapter 11, but this was impractical because the acquiring companies did
not usually publish financial information pertaining only to the acquired assets.
42 Anglo Energy, Braniff Airlines, Continental Airlines, Cook-United, HRT, Lionel,
Penn-Dixie (renamed Continental Steel), Phoenix Steel, Salant, Tacoma Boatbuilding,
Towle Manufacturing, Wilson Foods.
43 In 1990, there were 16,123 companies that were required to file reports with the
Securities & Exchange Commission. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, Directory of Companies
Required to File Annual Reports with the Securities & Exchange Commission (Septem-
ber 30, 1990). In that same year, the Securities & Exchange Commission reported that
85 publicly held companies filed petitions under Chapter 11. SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N,
PUBLIC COMPANIES FILING CHAPTER 11 PETITIONS (on file with authors). Thus, only
about one half of one percent of all public companies file petitions in a given year.
44 Anglo Energy (INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, July, 1989, at 84); Phoenix Steel (1033
Focus 26 (1989)); Tacoma Boatbuilding (SEATrLE TIMES, Dec. 18, 1991, at D8); and
Towle Manufacturing (Towle in Chapter 11, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1989, at L31). Two
other companies were incurring operating losses at confirmation and did not remedy the
problem before refiling. Cook-United (CHI. TRIB., Apr. 24, 1987, at C5); Penn-Dixie
(CHI. TRIB., Nov. 26, 1985, at CI).
Four of the refilings were caused in part by business decisions reached subsequent
to confirmation and may have had little to do with the company's financial condition at
confirmation. Continental Airlines (debt created by acquisitions and investments) (28
AIR TRANSP. WORLD 48 (1991)); Laura Liebeck, Dea Vu All Over Again: Lionel Re-Visits
Chapter 11, DISCOUNT STORE NEws, July 8, 1991, at 1, 41 (citing expenses in resisting a
takeover); Salant Files For Chapter 11, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1990, at D4 (citing debt cre-
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quires that, before a plan can be confirmed, the court must find that
"confirmation of the plan is not likely to be followed by the.., need
for further financial reorganization. ' 45 The rate of refiling suggests
that some courts are not taking this charge as seriously as they
should.
We were able to collect information about the post-confirma-
tion financial performance of twenty of the twenty-six surviving
companies that did not refile for bankruptcy. Of the twenty compa-
nies, exactly half suffered net operating losses in the year before fil-
ing.46 Six of these ten companies experienced significant increases
in asset size and operating income in the three years after confirma-
tion.47 Two of the other four companies experienced steady finan-
cial performance during these years.48 From this information we
conclude that Chapter 11 has sometimes been useful in dealing with
the first of the financial problems identified above-the failure to
earn operating profits.
In summary, evidence about the ability of large, publicly held
companies to resolve their financial problems in Chapter 11 is
mixed. Shortly after confirmation, a statistically significant majority
of the companies we studied had greater indebtedness than is cus-
tomary for their industry. In some cases that extra indebtedness led
to a future bankruptcy filing. Moreover, the general refiling rate for
companies that have emerged from Chapter 11 is extraordinarily
high. On the other hand, while in Chapter 11, a number of compa-
nies were able to correct whatever problems were causing their net
operating losses and conduct successful business after confirmation.
In terms of the financial rehabilitation objective with which it is com-
monly identified, Chapter 11 has had some successes. 49
ated by acquisition); and Wilson Foods (debt from takeover) (CHi. TRIB., Mar. 6, 1990,
at C2).
45 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (1988). Even though all classes have voted in favor of
the plan, the court must still make the finding in all cases.
46 We obtained data about net operating income or loss from annual financial re-
ports for the last complete fiscal year before filing. We calculated our own estimate of
net operating income or loss in order to exclude interest payments and income tax ben-
efits or expenses. Since half of the companies for which we obtained post-confirmation
financial data had net operating profits before filing, it seems likely those companies
chose to file Chapter 11 petitions primarily to deal with excessive debt load, though the
companies may have used the time in Chapter 11 to solve other problems as well.
47 The six companies that experienced operating losses before filing but exper-
ienced a growth period after confirmation were AM International, PHL Corp. (successor
to Baldwin-United), Nucorp, Storage Tech, NEOAX (successor to White Motor), and
Wickes Companies.
48 The companies experiencing operating losses before filing and a steady financial
performance post-confirmation were Crystal Oil and Energetics.
49 Of course, it is entirely possible that financial rehabilitation could have been
achieved even more successfully or at lesser cost by some other procedure, but that
conclusion would be difficult to establish empirically.
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VI
CHANGES IN CONTROL
Some commentators assert that managers or controlling share-
holders use Chapter 11 to maintain control of corporations. 50
Under this view, maintenance of control is a measure of the success
of Chapter 11.
We have reported elsewhere that a significant number of man-
agers were not able to stay in office throughout the Chapter 11 pro-
cess in those cases that we studied. In thirty-one of the forty-three
cases (70%) there was at least one change in CEO either during the
pendency of the Chapter 11 case or in contemplation under the re-
organization plan.51 Other studies confirm rapid corporate man-
ager turnover in Chapter 11 reorganizations of publicly held
companies. 52 For the managers of publicly held companies, Chap-
ter 11 is not the safe harbor that some have assumed. 53
The ownership of shares also usually changes dramatically be-
cause of the terms of the reorganization plan. Appendix Four re-
ports the percentage of shares retained under the reorganization
plan by holders of pre-filing shares (i.e., old equity) for the thirty-
eight entities in our study that survived Chapter 11. The following
table summarizes these data. As might be expected, reorganization
plans were much more likely to permit existing shareholders to re-
tain their shares when the company was solvent at confirmation.54
50 See LAURENCE H. KALLEN, CORPORATE WELFARE: THE MEGABANKRUPTCIES OF THE
80s AND 90s, at 468 (1991) ("Often... one must wonder just what has happened [in a
Chapter 11 case). The answer is simple: the jobs, salaries, and perks of those in the
executive suite... have been 'saved.' "); Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, Time to
Scuttle Chapter 11, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1992, at F13 ("[W]e believe that the principal
beneficiaries of Chapter 11 are corporate managers . . . Chapter 11 ... in fact serves
mainly to protect managers' jobs.").
51 LoPucki & Whitford, Corporate Governance, supra note 2, at 726. In a period begin-
ning eighteen months before filing and ending six months after confirmation, there was
at least one CEO change in 39 of the 43 cases. Id. at 723-26.
52 Stuart C. Gilson, Management Turnover and Financial Distress, 25J. FIN. ECON. 241,
247 (Table Three) (1989); Brian L. Betker, Management Changes, Equity's Bargaining
Power and Deviations from Absolute Priority in Chapter 11 Bankruptcies, at 8 (October
1991) (unpublished manuscript).
53 We do not doubt that Chapter 11 enables some managers to retain their jobs
longer than they would in its absence. In fact, we have argued elsewhere that Chapter
11 provides "soft landings" to managers by enabling them to negotiate their exits, and
explained the role that soft landings play in triggering reorganizations. See LoPucki &
Whitford, Corporate Governance, supra note 2, at 756-58. But this role falls far short of
making Chapter 11 a device that "serves mainly to protect manager's jobs." Bradley &
Rosenzweig, supra note 50.
54 We considered a company solvent at the time of confirmation if the value of the
properties distributed under the plan to unsecured creditors and shareholders exceeded
the estimated unsecured claims. See LoPucki & Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share,
supra note 4, at 141.
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For insolvent companies, however, it was rare for existing share-
holders to retain a majority of the reorganization shares. 55
TABLE 2
RETENTION OF OWNERSHIP BY PRE-FILING SHAREHOLDERS
Prefiling Prefiling Prefiling
shareholders shareholders retained shareholders
retained more than 10% but retained
less than 10% less than 50% 50% or more
of voting shares of voting shares of voting shares
Solvent companies 0 4 10
Insolvent companies 18 7 2
All companies 18 11 12
We conclude that Chapter 11 has not been a vehicle by which
insiders have retained control of large, publicly held companies.
Changes in control are regular occurrences in the Chapter 11 reor-
ganizations of these companies.
CONCLUSION
This account presents a mixed picture of what happens to large,
publicly held firms in Chapter 11. There are "successes," regard-
less of which definition of success is used. Most significantly, there
are companies that retain their core businesses in Chapter 11 and
become financially successful after confirmation. 56 These Chapter
11 experiences confirm the popular conception of Chapter 11 as a
place where the company with remediable financial problems has an
opportunity to make necessary changes. Chapter 11 is not a com-
plete failure.
Nonetheless, there are problems with Chapter 11. Particularly
disturbing is the evidence that many large, publicly held companies
emerge from Chapter 11 with too much debt and refile for bank-
ruptcy at a strikingly high rate.57
Two consistent patterns emerge from the forty-three cases we
studied. First, a reduction in asset size is an almost uniform feature
55 The old shareholders of an insolvent filing company received a majority of the
shares of the emerging company in only two of the cases we studied. In Dreco Energy,
61%o of the shares were issued to the old shareholders. In Energetics, the company
surrendered all but $3 million of its assets to a secured creditor and then reorganized
around the remainder. In both cases, a cohesive group of individuals held a controlling
block of shares at the time the company filed its petition. Such a cohesive control group
existed in only a few of the 43 cases we studied. We suspect that the existence of such a
group makes it more likely that the old shareholders will be able to retain control of a
large, publicly held company as it reorganizes.
56 Supra text accompanying note 27.
57 See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
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of the Chapter 11 experience when a large, publicly held company is
involved. 58 Though few companies cease to exist entirely, nearly all
engage in some form of liquidation. The distinction commonly
drawn between reorganizations and liquidations is misleading. Sec-
ond, those formerly in control of a corporation ordinarily lose their
position during a Chapter 11 case.59 Commentators who assume
that Chapter 11 provides an easy way for managers or shareholders
to maintain control of large, publicly held companies should re-eval-
uate their positions.
Apart from these consistencies, the data suggests that the chief
characteristic of Chapter 11 is variety. There is no stereotypical pat-
tern for a Chapter 11 case involving a large, publicly held company.
In about half of the cases studied, the core business survived intact
within a single entity. Sometimes the survival was in the same en-
tity; sometimes it was as part of a sale to another company. In the
other cases, the company "shattered." 60 When a company shatters
it often liquidates, either totally or nearly so. In a number of cases,
a shell of the original company emerged from Chapter 11 for the
principal purpose of preserving and using accumulated NOLs.6 t
Proposals for reform of Chapter 11 should take this multiplicity
of uses into account. Proposals designed to enhance some uses may
hinder other uses. For example, in some circumstances Chapter 11
may be a better vehicle for liquidating a large, publicly held com-
pany than Chapter 7. The sale of a large block of assets may yield a
higher price if the company is allowed more time to search for an
appropriate buyer than is generally permitted under Chapter 7.62
In some cases there may be an inadequate market for parts of the
company, and the claimants to the Chapter 11 estate will be better
served if the filing company reorganizes around those parts, even if
most of the company is liquidated.63 A requirement that a company
58 Supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
59 Supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
60 Supra notes 19-27 and accompanying text.
61 Supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
62 Prices may also be higher because, in Chapter 11, sales are not forced. A com-
pany can always choose to reorganize, and this option may provide the company the
leverage needed to negotiate a more favorable price. See LoPucki & Whitford, Corporate
Governance, supra note 2, at 759-65. This analysis assumes that it is desirable for the
assets of a bankrupt company to be sold at the highest possible price. See id. at 752
n.264.
63 An excellent example is the liquidation of Baldwin-United, one of the chapter 11
cases we studied. Baldwin-United was a conglomerate with many unrelated businesses.
Even before its filing the principally interested parties agreed that the company should
be liquidated. Victor Palmieri and Associates, who had wide experience in the liquida-
tion of large companies, was retained to do so. After several years Palmieri and Associ-
ates concluded that certain of Baldwin-United's businesses were best retained and
operated by a surviving entity. The conclusion was based on its assessment that none of
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be auctioned shortly after filing-a commonly made reform propo-
sa164-may prevent some financially unwise reorganizations, but it
may also foreclose liquidation in the most efficient manner. It is far
from clear that bankruptcy would be a better institution if all cases
were forced into a single mold.
the bidders for parts of the company were offering an appropriate price, largely because
there were not many other companies that wanted to get into the businesses concerned.
The largest of these businesses was a trading stamp company (S & H Green Stamps).
The entity (PHL Corp.) that did survive on the recommendation of Palmieri and Associ-
ates has been financially successful. See supra note 47. The information reported in this
footnote comes largely from interviews with attorneys representing key parties in the
Baldwin-United case.

















































Sources: Assets reported on the Petition in Bankruptcy.
for publicly held companies.
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The SEC collects this information
65 The symbol "N.A." means that the information was not available.
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APPENDIX 2
REDUCTION IN ASSET SIZE OF SURVIVING ENTITIES
Asset size Asset size
in millions in millions aft
as per as per as
last report first report
before filing after confirmation

























































































Sources: Annual financial reports were obtained either from SEC 10-K reports or from the
company's annual reports. The reports show asset size at the end of a particular fiscal year.
66 The symbol "N.A." means that the information was not available.
67 Maverick Tube was a major subsidiary of Nucorp at filing. The court confirmed a
separate plan for Maverick Tube. The plan awarded the shares of the emerging
company to creditors of the subsidiary. We did not consider Maverick Tube a surviving
entity of the company that filed, and we have not counted its assets ($26 million at
confirmation) as assets held after confirmation for the surviving entity. The
reorganization plan created a new corporation, Pin Oak Petroleum, which got most of
the company's remaining assets. Fifty-one percent of Pin Oak's shares were distributed
to prepetition creditors of Nucorp, and the remainder went to Nucorp itself. We
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APPENDIX 3
DEBT/EQUITY RATIOS OF EMERGING COMPANIES
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Debt/ Bench Excess of SIC Codes
Equity mark debt over and
ratio ratio for bench mark categories fo
Company after size and column 1 minus bench mark































































+806 4700 Water transportation services
+69 3050 Manufacturing, mechanical
rubber goods
+63 3560 Manufacturing; general
industrial machinery
+32 2345 Manufacturing, women's and
children's clothing; 5600 retail
trade; apparel and accessory
stores
+26 2315 Manufacturing, men's and
boys' clothing; 2345
Manufacturing, women's and girl's
clothing
+25 4500 Air transportation services
+24 3570 Office and computing
machines; 3860 Photographic
equipment and supplies
+23 5170 Wholesale trade, petroleum
and petroleum products
+21 4500 Air transportation services
+21 5060 Electrical goods; 4700
Transportation services
+ 17 1330 Mining, crude petroleum and
natural gas and gas liquids
+ 17 3730 Manufacturing, ship and boat
building and repairing
+ 15 3570 Manufacturing, office and
computing machines
+ 14 3440 Manufacturing; fabricated
structural metal products
+ 11 3298 Manufacturing, nonmetalic
mineral products; 2625
Manufacturing, paper and allied
products
+8 6352 Insurance
+6 5220 Retail trade; building materials
dealers
+4 3440 Manufacturers, fabricated
structural metal products
+1 2010 Manufacturing, foods and
kindred products
-5 3530 Manufacturing, construction
and related machinery
-6 1380 Mining, oil and gas field
services
-18 1380 Mining, oil and gas field
services
-22 1330 Mining, crude petroleum and
natural gas and gas liquids
-26 5995 Retail trade, miscellaneous
retail stores
-38 3490 Manufacturing, miscellaneous
fabricated metal products
-44 1330 Mining, crude petroleum and
natural gas and gas liquids
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APPENDIX 3
DEBT/EQUITY RATIOS OF EMERGING COMPANIES
CONTINUED
68 The companies are ranked from highest to lowest according to the difference (as
shown in column three) between the Debt/Equity ratios and the benchmark ratios.
69 We calculated the debt to equity ratios shown here from the balance sheet con-
tained in the first set of fiscal-year-end financial statements issued by the company after
confirmation. Such accounting data do not necessarily reflect the true values of the eq-
uity. But we use the ratios derived for comparison with published average debt to equity
ratios in the debtors' industries. Those ratios were calculated from accounting data.
70 The SIC codes shown are for either companies in the debtor's size category in
the industry in which the debtor was primarily engaged at the end of the fiscal year in
which the debtor emerged from bankruptcy. If the debtor engaged substantially in more
than one industry, we give SIC codes for the two industries in which the debtor's partici-
pation was greatest, and the benchmark ratio used is the average of the benchmarks for
the two size/industry categories. We categorized the companies we studied based on
the businesses and SIC codes reported for them in the Disclosure, Inc. database. The
benchmark ratios are from TROY, supra note 37.
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APPENDIX 4
PERCENT OF SHARES RETAINED BY OLD EQuITY
Percent of
reorganization shares





Smith International 81% .






























Seatrain Lines 0 %
Technical Equities 07%
Towner Petroleum 07%
Sources: Disclosure statements accompanying the confirmed plan of reorganization.
